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I. Introduction
The 1988 presidential campaign has already begun. With it has
come widespread circumvention of federal campaign regulation.
Potential presidential candidates have formed political action com-
mittees to promote their candidacies, and in so doing have dodged
the letter and frustrated the spirit of the Federal Election Campaign
Act of 1971 (FECA).1 Although this type of evasion occurred in ear-
lier elections, it has burgeoned in the current campaign. As a result,
we are in the process of electing a president without the benefit of
critical safeguards against excessive candidate spending and fund-
raising.
The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and the FECA
Amendments of 1974 form the backbone of modem federal cam-
paign regulation. These laws addressed two central problems: first,
campaign expenditures were spiralling beyond all sensible limits, 2
and second, campaign spending was being funded by large private
contributions to candidates. 3 Congress' solution to these problems
was to set statutory limits on both contributions to federal cam-
paigns4 and overall campaign expenditures, 5 and to use public
funds to finance all phases of presidential campaigns.6 Congress
1. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972)
(1972 Act); amended by Pub. L. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974) (1974 Amendments), Pub. L.
40-283, 90 Stat. 475 (1976) (1976 Amendments), Pub. L. No. 96-187, 93 Stat. 1339
(1980) (1979 Amendments); codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-54 (1982).
2. The House Report accompanying the 1974 Amendments explains that
in response to the problem of spiralling campaign costs and increasing campaign
expenditures, the committee has adopted specific limits on the amount a candidate
and the committees that support his candidacy may spend.
H.R. REP. No. 1239, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1974) [hereinafter HousE REPORT].
3. Id. at 13, citing "the dangers of... the influence of excessive private political
contributions." This interest in regulating an "aspect of political association where the
actuality and potential for corruption have been identified" was deemed weighty enough
to make the contribution limits of the FECA Amendments of 1974 constitutional, de-
spite their effects upon first amendment freedoms. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 28-
29 (1976) (per curiam).
4. 1974 Amendments, Pub. L. No. 93-443, § lla, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974).
5. 1972 Act § 203.
6. Pub. L. No. 92-178, §§ 801-02, 85 Stat. 497, 562-74 (1971); 1974 Amendments,
Pub. L. No. 93-443 §§ 406 and 408. Other important provisions of these reforms in-
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was also aware of two types of action that would render its efforts to
regulate campaigns futile: campaign spending by groups not offi-
cially affiliated with a candidate, and spending by candidates prior to
the time in the campaign when federal regulations become appli-
cable. Thus, to protect its regulatory scheme from subversion, Con-
gress also limited "independent" expenditures.
7
Similarly, because the authors of the FECA Amendments of 1974
also sought to equalize the financial resources of presidential candi-
dates,8 public financing was made available to primary candidates. 9
As the Senate Report explained, "[u]nless primary election candi-
dates can be relieved of their excessive dependence on large
amounts of private money, a system of public financing in general
elections will only move the evils it seeks to remedy upstream to the
primary phase of the electoral process." 10 The present use of candi-
date-organized political action committees (COPACs) undermines
campaign regulation in precisely the ways that Congress intended to
forestall, for such organizations reintroduce the problems of cam-
paign contributions and expenditures that are not subject to full
federal regulation.
cluded the required reporting of contributions and expenditures, 1972 Act §§ 302-06,
limits upon independent expenditures, 1974 Amendments § 101(a), and the establish-
ment of the Federal Election Commission to oversee compliance with the law, 1974
Amendments § 208(a).
The constitutionality of the 1974 Amendments was immediately challenged. In the
landmark case of Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam) the Supreme Court
found that a number of the law's provisions violated the first amendment's guarantee of
free speech. "Independent" expenditures and expenditures from the candidate's per-
sonal funds were held not subject to limitations because they represented the speech of
the person supplying the funds. However, the Court upheld limitations on the use by
candidates of money contributed to them by others. Such limits only indirectly im-
pinged upon the free speech rights of the contributors, the Court said, and so could be
regulated in order to avoid the fact or appearance of corruption.
7. 1974 Amendments § 101(a). Congress recognized that "[albsent a limitation on
this activity, well-heeled groups and individuals could spend substantial sums and thus
severely compromise the limitations on spending by the supported candidate himself."
House REPORT, supra note 2.
8. As the Senate Committee report on the 1974 Amendments recognized, simply
limiting contributions and expenditures would not keep private money from unduly af-
fecting campaigns:
[W]ith the introduction of specific limitations upon contributions and expenditures,
concern developed that major political parties and well-known individuals, includ-
ing incumbent office-holders, would have greater access and appeal to donors than
would minor parties and unknown individuals who desired to enter the political
arena. Therefore, a movement for the public financing of Federal elections evolved
in the Senate.
S.REP. No. 689, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1974) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT].
9. See 26 U.S.C. § 9032(2) (1982).




II. Federal Regulation of Presidential Campaigns
Federal regulation of presidential campaigns is designed to begin
as soon as an individual legally becomes a candidate. Under the
FECA, individuals are deemed to be "candidates" for the presi-
dency as soon as they have received contributions or made expendi-
tures in excess of $5000." l No further actions or announcements
are necessary to establish their candidacies, and once $5000 is
raised or spent, no actions or announcements can prevent their be-
ing branded official candidates. Such status makes the full panoply
of federal regulations applicable to the candidates and their cam-
paign committees. These regulations require 1) that they must keep
and make public records of their receipts and expenditures, 2) that
they may not accept contributions of over $1000 from any one indi-
vidual, nor any contribution exceeding $5000 from a political action
committee, 3) that all campaign expenditures prior to the nomina-
tion may not exceed a specified amount (most recently $20.2 mil-
lion), and 4) that spending in each state also may not exceed certain
ceilings.' 2 Needless to say, candidates often find these constraints
onerous.
A limited exception to these strict rules has been made for explor-
atory or so-called "testing the waters" activity.' 3 Funds raised for or
spent on certain activities (such as polling or travel to meet with
party leaders) may be handled by an exploratory committee formed
for the purpose of evaluating a candidacy's potential. This excep-
tion allows a potential candidate to take some tentative steps to-
wards running without being ascribed official "candidate" status by
the Federal Election Commission (FEC). The potential candidate
must take the initiative in forming such a committee, and it may un-
dertake actions designed only to explore, not to further, the con-
templated candidacy. Under such circumstances, the committee
may spend over $5000 without triggering official "candidate" status.
Should a candidacy later emerge, however, these "testing the wa-
ters" expenditures must be retroactively reported and counted
against the overall and state-by-state ceilings.14 Similarly, contribu-
tions to an exploratory committee count towards limitations on con-
tributions to presidential candidates.1 5
11. 2 U.S.C. § 431(2) (1982).
12. 2 U.S.C. §§ 432b, 4 4 1e-441g (1982).
13. 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.7(b)(1), 100.8(b)(1) (1986).
14. See 11 C.F.R. § 101.3 (1986); 11 C.F.R. §§ 9032.9(c), 9034.4(a)(2) (1986). See also
50 Fed. Reg. 9995 (1985).
15. See 11 C.F.R. § 101.3 (1986). See also 50 Fed. Reg. 9995 (1985).
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The FEC is charged with overseeing campaign and "testing the
waters" activity, and with enforcing all applicable law. Where ex-
isting regulations are unclear, the FEC is empowered to respond to
specific questions by issuing Advisory Opinions to guide individuals
or PACs in obeying the law. These Opinions are designed to apply
only to the precise circumstances set forth in the request.' 6
III. COPACs' Subversion of Federal Regulation
COPACs serve some legitimate functions. Spokesmen for these
PACs regularly assert that their organizations serve solely to pro-
mote candidacies of fellow party members, not to advance the candi-
dacy of their organizer,' 7 and so are like all other "multicandidate"
political action committees. Indeed, COPACs are uniquely suited to
their professed, and proper function. The national name-recogni-
tion of the COPAC's organizer makes fund-raising relatively easy,
and the COPAC, at least in theory, channels those funds to deserv-
ing candidates.
Of course, even the professed function of COPACs is not without
substantial advantages for their organizers' presidential aspirations.
Ann Lewis, political director of the Democratic National Committee,
explained that "it is widely conceded that a campaign contribution
[from the COPAC to a local, state or federal candidate] helps in win-
ning a presidential endorsement [from the recipient candidate] later
on."' 8 Whether it simply spreads a little good will or establishes
long-term political alliances, such a contribution benefits the donor
as well as the recipient.
The gains from organizing a PAC extend far beyond the gratitude
16. See generally 2 U.S.C. § 437(f) (1982). Such Opinions are to be relied upon only
by persons "involved in the specific transaction or activity with respect to which such
advisory opinion is rendered" or in a "transaction or activity which is indistinguishable
in all its material aspects from the transaction or activity with respect to which such
advisory opinion is rendered." 2 U.S.C. § 437f(c)(1).
17. When Vice-President Walter Mondale formed the Committee for the Future of
America, one of his advisors insisted that "[t]his is not a Mondale campaign operation.
We see this as a means of getting good Democrats elected." Light, Challenging the Right:
New Liberal Money Groups Compete for Campaign Funds, 39 CONG. Q. 1905, 1908 (1981).
The speaker, Michael Berman, was later appointed treasurer of Mondale's campaign
committee.
18. Campaign PAC Contributions, 40 CONG. Q. 2075 (1982). See also Light, supra note
17, at 1907 ("the new PAC offers a way for Kennedy to spread good will.., between
now and the next national election"). See also Bonafede, Mondale at the End of the Begin-
ning of the Long Road to the Oval Office, 15 Nat'l. J. 162 (1983) (Mondale so far has followed
"a carefully designed series of steps ... early on, he created a political action commit-
tee. . . to. . .support . . .Democratic candidates, thereby broadening and solidifying




of fellow office-seekers. For a potential candidate, a COPAC can
serve as an all-purpose expense account. Vice-President George
Bush and Representative Jack Kemp, both likely contenders for the
1988 Republican presidential nomination, "expect to make some
150 PAC-financed political appearances this year [1986]."' 9 Lest
they appear to be selfless servants of their party, it should be noted
that "[b]oth have scheduled frequent trips to early presidential pri-
mary states of New Hampshire, Iowa, and Michigan in the hope ap-
pearances on behalf of fellow Republicans will also enhance their
own recognition and standing in key states." 20 Such use of a
COPAC is time-honored. In 1984, both Mondale's COPAC and
Senator Edward Kennedy's Fund for a Democratic Majority lavished
attention upon Democratic candidates in Iowa, the site of the earli-
est presidential caucuses. 2' And the earliest COPAC, formed in
1977 by an ex-Governor named Ronald Reagan, was used to finance
that future presidential candidate's travels across the country. 22
Travel is not the only expense COPACs have been used to defray.
At the headquarters of Jack Kemp's COPAC, the Campaign for
Prosperity, "they are [now] working with his [official] aides and
outside advisors . . . to organize Kemp's travels; they are gathering
names of supporters, sending local Republican leaders fact sheets
on Kemp's economic views and targeting congressional races for the
PAC to invest in." 23 Walter Mondale spent two years, courtesy of
his Committee for the Future of America, "travelling the national
political circuit . . . sounding out supporters, assembling a staff,
drafting a campaign script and raising money - all with the obvious
intent of winning the 1984 presidential election. In effect, . . con-
ducting what an aide called a 'shadow presidential campaign.' "24
19. Reuters, Jan. 24, 1986 (NEXIS newsfile).
20. Id.
21. Campaign PAC Contributions, supra note 18.
22. Id. These appearances are defended as designed to help other candidates raise
money. Indeed, Bush's PAC claims that his travels in 1985 helped Republican candi-
dates raise $11 million. Associated Press, Feb. 12, 1986 (NEXIS newsfile).
23. Brownstein, Sands of Time Move Quickly for Manager of Kemp's PAC, 17 Nat'l J. 162
(1985).
24. Bonafede, supra note 18. See also Kirchsten, If Reagan Chooses Not to Run Again,
The GOP Battle Could Be A Bloody One, 15 Nat'l. J. 6081 (1983) ("If [Senator Howard]
Baker finds himself as a candidate in 1984, his political fund [PAC] can be used to ad-
vance his cause in the presidential primaries"); Associated Press, Feb. 11, 1986
(NEXIS newsfile), reporting on COPAC expenditures ("The PACs expenditures covered
mostly political costs such as printing and postage, consultant fees, travel, office equip-
ment, and payrolls"); United Press International, Jan. 23, 1986 (NEXIS newsfile) ("The
PACs of potential candidates can be used to pay travel expenses, hold rallies, pay for
food and drink at hospitality suites - all the normal activities of a candidate").
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Underwriting travel and administrative costs is a legitimate part of
each COPAC's official mission of providing assistance to party can-
didates. However, an analysis of COPACs' spending patterns
reveals that defraying the organizer's expenses is of paramount
rather than incidental importance. The first COPAC, Reagan's Citi-
zens for the Republic, gave less than 15 percent of the money it
raised in 1978 to Republican candidates and party organizations.
The lion's share of that COPAC's funds went to underwrite Rea-
gan's expenses between his 1976 and 1980 presidential cam-
paigns.2 5 Similarly, when Mondale and Kennedy launched their
COPACs in 1981, over 90 percent of the funds raised were spent on
staff, travel, and further fund-raising, leaving under 10 percent for
the COPACs' supposed beneficiaries - other federal, state, and lo-
cal candidates.2 6 Through 1982, Mondale's Committee for the Fu-
ture of America raised and spent $2.4 million, while using only
about $700,000 for activities related to Democratic candidates' cam-
paigns. "The remainder was spent in start-up expenses, fund rais-
ing, research, travel, operational costs, staff. . . and direct mail. An
estimated 2.5 million fund-raising letters were sent." 27 The Com-
mittee was thus tremendously inefficient at its professed task of aid-
ing other candidates. It did, however, provide Vice-President
Mondale with a formidable machinery of financial, organizational,
intellectual, and public relations assistance. In other words, the
COPAC served as a "shadow presidential campaign."
28
Present potential candidates have demonstrated the same propen-
sity to form COPACs with the official goal of helping other candi-
dates, only to use the money for their own expenses. Kemp's
COPAC raised $245,207 for the 1982 elections, but channelled only
$104,500 to Republican candidates.2 9 Senator Robert Dole's
COPAC, "Campaign America," raised $231,376 during the same
period, but disbursed only $165,728 to other campaigns. 30
The most recent FEC figures demonstrate how widespread this
practice has become:3 '
25. Campaign PAC Contributions, supra note 18, at 2074.
26. Id. at 2075.
27. Bonafede, supra note 18, at 163.
28. This willingness to use political committees creatively became a major campaign
issue once the primary season began and the Mondale organization began using dele-
gate selection committees to finance campaign expenditures as a means of escaping the
spending ceilings mandated by the FECA. See generally Glen, Another Campaign, Another
Loophole - This Time It's Delegate Committees, 16 Nat'lJ. 873, 874-75 (May 5, 1984).
29. Kirschten, supra note 24, at 610.
30. Id. at 609.





COPAC (Organizer) $ Raised $ Spent other candidates
Fund for America's Future 820,089 1.2 million 121,000
(Vice-President
George Bush)
Campaign America 417,976 not available 57,785
(Senator Robert Dole)
Committee for Freedom 161,339 56,287 11,583
(Rev. Pat Robertson)
Effective Government 361,546 240,734 6,590
Committee
(Rep. Richard Gephardt)
Americans for the 51,219 45,746 250
National Interest
(Gov. Bruce Babbitt)
As this table indicates, 32 COPACs are only marginally in the busi-
ness of helping other candidates. They chiefly serve to help their
founders travel, speak, hobnob, and tout themselves as presidential
timber. This fact has been acknowledged in the media33 and by
COPAC staff.34 Most recently it was forcefully expressed by Federal
Elections Commissioner Thomas E. Harris:
Only persons just alighting from a U.F.O. can doubt that activities of
COPAC, Campaign for Prosperity, has raised $1.2 million. That COPAC's spending
figures are not available. Id.
32. COPACs' spokesmen assert that the percentage of funds reported as having
been given to candidates in 1985 is misleading, as candidates have been saving their
funds for the election year of 1986. Kirschten, supra note 24, at 610. The ultimate proof
of this contention will be found in next year's FEC data. However, it is worth noting that
past COPACs have not spent a significant percentage of their funds on helping nonpre-
sidential candidates' campaigns. Moreover, COPACs' contributions to candidates to
date are low not only as a percentage of funds raised and available, but as a percentage
of funds actually spent.
33. For example, Reuters News Service recently reported that "[a]t present, most of
the potential candidates are using so-called multicandidate PACs to finance their na-
tional travels without having to comply with limitations on presidential campaign spend-
ing." Reuters, Jan. 24, 1986 (NEXIS newsfile) See also Light, supra note 17, at 1906
("Senator Edward M. Kennedy's Fund for a Democratic Majority and former Vice-Presi-
dent Walter F. Mondale's Committee for the Future of America are widely thought to be
vehicles for the 1984 presidential campaign"). See also Porter, Washington's Movers and
Shakers; Where They're Going, 13 Nat'lJ. 329 (Feb. 21, 1981) ("Two defeated Democrats
[Mondale and Kennedy] are busy pulling together political action committees for possi-
ble 1984 runs for the presidency").
34. In moments of candor, the heads of COPACs indicate that they are in the busi-
ness of presidential politics. John Maxwell, executive director of Kemp's Campaign for
Prosperity, recently explained why he accepted his post in this way: "It was too interest-
ing a thing not to do, having run politics at all levels except this one. His interviewer
adds: "having worked on gubernatorial, House, and Senate races, Maxwell didn't have
to explain exactly what level of politics 'this' is. Hold on to your hats, it's on to Iowa
[site of the first party caucuses]." Brownstein, supra note 23.
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these sorts [public appearances, partisan publications, and the or-
ganizing of volunteers in early primary states], which are engaged in
over a period of many months, will promote the candidacy of the
founding father [of the COPAC]. . . . Disbursements for these activi-
ties are made for the purpose of influencing a federal election ....
[and so] should trigger . . . reporting obligations, and should count
against the national and state expenditure ceilings . . ..
IV. Harms From COPAC's Circumvention of Federal Campaign Law
A. Campaign Contributions
COPACs are being used by presidential candidates to finance the
activities essential to the beginnings of a presidential primary cam-
paign. As such, they undermine the structure of federal campaign
regulation established by the FECA.3 6 That law explicitly recog-
nizes that potential candidates may desire to conduct certain prelim-
inary activities without becoming full-fledged "candidates," and so
provides for a middle ground between candidacy and non-candi-
dacy: "testing the waters." However, potential candidates are pres-
ently ignoring the middle ground created by statute in order to
enjoy unregulated COPAC financing of their exploratory activities.
These actions subvert important policies regarding both cam-
paign contributions and campaign spending. An official candidate,
as well as an individual who is "testing the waters," may not be
given more than $1000 by any individual; 37 that candidate's PAC,
however, may be given five times as much by the same individual. 38
Congress established the $1000 ceiling on individuals' contributions
to presidential candidates so that wealthy persons could not secure
excessive gratitude from or influence over candidates for the presi-
dency.3 9 The $1000 limit also militates against even the appearance
of undue influence. The limit on contributions to COPACs is
higher because money given to a potential presidential candidate's
COPAC is supposedly redistributed to local, state, and federal can-
didates. Potential candidates are less likely to be or seem corrupted
35. Advisory Opinion 1986-6, Federal Election Commission, FED. ELECTION CAMP.
FIN. GUIDE (CCH) 5849 at 11,261 (Mar. 14, 1986) (Harris, Comm'r, dissenting) [here-
inafter Advisory Opinion 1986-6]. This comment was provoked by the circumstances
described in the text accompanying notes 47 through 66.
36. The FECA assumes that campaign expenditures of over $5000 - no matter how
they are characterized - make an individual an official "candidate" and therefore sub-
ject to reporting requirements and limits on contribution and spending levels. 2 U.S.C.
§ 431(2) (1982).
37. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(A)(1982).
38. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(l)(C)(1982).




by money given to them for redistribution than by money given to
help them pursue their individual ambitions. Also, contributions to
COPACs are in theory contributions to organizations, not
individuals.
In practice, however, COPACs are neither conduits for the redis-
tribution of funds to a variety of candidates nor organizations with
interests apart from those of their founder. The are shadow presi-
dential campaigns, 40 and a donation to a COPAC is equivalent to a
donation to the individual who organized it. There is therefore no
reason for allowing higher contribution ceilings to COPACs than to
official candidates; money received for the purpose of beginning a
campaign carries the same potential for impropriety as money re-
ceived once the primaries have begun and candidacies have been
officially announced.
Indeed, contributions to COPACs may be even more dangerous
and suggestive of undue influence than regular contributions. Such
contributions are buried in the COPAC's reports to the FEC, and
there they are not immediately associable with the candidate behind
the PAC. They also occur early in the campaign season, when can-
didates may find money particularly scarce. Hence, the potential for
a candidate to become or seem to become beholden to wealthy
($5000) givers is heightened, not diminished, when the money is
given to his or her COPAC rather than his or her subsequent, "offi-
cial" campaign committee. 4t COPAC donations allow the big givers
of pre-FECA elections to reassume their unduly powerful positions,
and thereby a critical purpose of federal election regulation is
thwarted.
B. Campaign Spending
In addition to regulating campaign contributions, a second critical
40. See supra notes 17-35 and accompanying text.
41. Candidate-organized foundations, though less common than COPACs, can like-
wise serve to finance campaign activities outside of FECA regulation. Because the foun-
dations may accept unlimited sums of money from individuals or organizations, they
pose the risk of even greater violations of the policies behind campaign contribution
limitations. For example, Senator Gary Hart, preparing for the 1988 campaign, has es-
tablished a tax-exempt foundation, The Center for a New Democracy, which has ac-
cepted ten gifts of $25,000 each. Such gifts are substantially larger than those that could
legally be given to an official campaign committee, even though the foundation "appears
intended to flesh out Hart's 1984 'new ideas campaign' in preparation for another run
for the Presidency in 1988." Edsall, '88 Candidates' New Tricks Stretch Federal Election Law:
Tax-Free Foundations Proliferate, Washington Post, Oct. 20, 1985, at A18, col. 1. The article
also mentions similar foundations established by Senator Kennedy and Representative
Kemp.
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purpose of the FECA is to limit campaign spending. These limits
are designed to equalize spending levels between candidates by
placing ceilings on the total amount a candidate may spend prior to
his or her party's nominating convention and upon the amount a
candidate may spend in each particular state. 42
COPAC expenditures have not been counted towards these ceil-
ings because neither any COPAC nor the FEC has been willing to
characterize them as candidate expenditures. 43 Thus, potential can-
didates are eager to spend COPAC money in key primary states,
saving room under the ceilings for later spending. For example, the
Freedom Council, a political organization established in 1981 by
evangelist and potential presidential candidate Pat Robertson, has
dedicated five of its thirty field staffers to Michigan, which is the first
state to begin the process of choosing delegates to the Republican
national convention. 44 Similarly, Kemp's COPAC has seen fit to fly
the New York Representative to Michigan, Iowa and New Hamp-
shire (each of which begins choosing its delegates to the nominating
convention early in the primary season) more often than to any
other state in the union.45 Despite these activities, Robertson and
Kemp may later spend as much as any other candidate in these criti-
cal states because their COPACs, not their official campaign com-
mittees, have been doing the early spending.
Such activities subvert limitations on campaign spending, with un-
fortunate consequences. Candidates using COPACs are positioned
to outspend rivals without COPACs, who must count travel to early
primary states as campaign expenditures. Similarly, candidates with
large COPAC budgets and staffs will be able to outspend those with
smaller COPACs. This ability to outspend will have both cumula-
tive effects over the primary season and special force in the critical,
earliest primary states. By spending COPAC funds, candidates may
create state and national organizations and support without officially
spending any money. This loophole induces some candidates to
lengthen the campaign season, since they need not worry about ap-
proaching the FECA ceilings. Most importantly, this loophole sys-
tematically favors well-known and well-financed candidates over
candidates who cannot command COPAC contributions46 by al-
42. 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a(b),(c) (1982).
43. The limits apply to expenditures made by a candidate or his or her authorized
committee or agents. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(b)(2)(1982).
44. Edsall, supra note 41.
45. Id.




lowing the former to accept large contributions and outspend their
lesser-known rivals.
V. FEC Reactions to COPAC Activities
Twice in the past year the FEC has been asked to issue an Advi-
sory Opinion explaining the applicability of the FECA to particular
types of COPAC expenditures. 47 The FEC's responses48 are schizo-
phrenic; one recognizes that these activities are indeed designed to
further presidential ambitions, but the other represses this insight
by refusing to count these expenditures against the spending
ceiling.
The first of these requests was made late in 1985, when Senator
Howard Baker's COPAC, the Republican Majority Fund, asked the
FEC to clarify whether certain expenditures planned by the Fund
would be considered in-kind contributions to the Senator's "testing
the waters" committee. 49 The FEC ruled that the Fund's expendi-
tures on a variety of activities - Senator Baker's and his representa-
tives' travel to party events, hospitality suites in his honor at party
events, the formation of COPAC steering committees in individual
states, and newsletters and solicitations referring to Senator Baker's
potential candidacy - all would help the Senator evaluate his po-
tential candidacy and so would constitute contributions to his "test-
ing the waters" committee. 50 The Opinion also advised that such
expenditures would be considered contributions to an official cam-
paign if the Senator indicated he had definitely decided to seek the
nomination. 5 1
tensively in 1981-82, while the lesser known Senator Gary Hart did not. See Glen, supra
note 28, at 874.
47. Letter from James M. Cannon, Vice Chairman, Republican Majority Fund to
Federal Election Commission requesting Advisory Opinion (Nov. 25, 1985) (copy on file
with YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW); Letter from Jan Baran, Esq. on behalf of the Fund for
America's Future to Federal Election Commission (Jan. 22, 1986) (Copy on file with
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW).
48. Advisory Opinion 1985-40, Federal Election Commission, FED. ELECTION CAMP.
FIN. GUIDE (CCH) 5842 (Jan. 28, 1986) [hereinafter Advisory Opinion 1985-40]; Advi-
sory Opinion 1986-6, supra note 35.
49. Letter from James M. Cannon to Federal Election Commission, supra note 47; see
also Advisory Opinion Request 1985-40, byJames M. Cannon, Vice Chairman, Republi-
can Majority Fund, FED. ELECTION CAMp. FIN. GUIDE (CCH) 3924.
50. As of April 1986, Senator Baker was the only potential presidential candidate to
have established a "testing the waters" committee. Aides to the Senator indicated that
Baker's Fund sought to have COPAC expenditures characterized as "testing the waters"
activity so that other candidates using COPACs would be forced to form exploratory
committees. Reuters, Jan. 24, 1986 (NEXIS newsfile). Subsequent FEC action makes it
clear that the Commission did not adopt this logic.
51. Advisory Opinion 1986-6, supra note 35. Contributions to "testing the waters"
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On the heels of this ruling, Vice-President Bush's COPAC, the
Fund for America's Future, requested an Advisory Opinion regard-
ing similar expenditures.5 2 The FEC's response advised that it
would not constitute campaign activity for the COPAC to finance
Vice-President Bush's travel to party events, the formation of
COPAC steering committees, publications and solicitations identify-
ing Bush as the COPAC's founder, the training of volunteers, and
the establishment of offices for these volunteers to staff.53 Each of
these conclusions included a reminder that these actions would be
licit only so long as they remained unrelated to a potential Bush
candidacy. Each conclusion also distinguished the Advisory Opin-
ion issued to Baker's COPAC as involving expenditures aiding a
candidate who had already begun "testing the waters."
54
One additional issue raised in the Fund for America's Future Ad-
visory Opinion request was the status of the Fund's proposed ex-
penditures to recruit, inform, and finance individuals seeking
election as precinct delegates to the 1986 Michigan state Republican
committees are limited in the same ways as contributions to campaign committees. See
11 C.F.R. § 100.7(b)(1), 100.8(b)(l), 101.3 (1986) (establishing that the contribution
source and amount limits applicable to campaign committees are applicable to explora-
tory committees) and at 2 U.S.C. § 441a (1985) (establishing contribution limits for
campaign committees). See also 50 Fed. Reg. 9993-94 (1985). Thus a COPAC, like any
other PAC, may give only $5000 in cash or in-kind contributions to aid "testing the
waters" efforts. This sharply limits the usefulness of a COPAC.
52. Advisory Opinion Request 1986-6, by Jan Baran, Esq. on behalf of the Fund for
America's Future, FED. ELECTION CAMP. FIN. GUIDE (CCH) 3937. See also Letter from
Jan Baran, Esq. to Federal Election Commission, supra note 47. This immediate reaction
belied the words ofJan Baran, counsel to Bush's COPAC, who asserted that "[i]t doesn't
appear this is going to affect the Fund for America's Future at all." A more realistic
approach was taken by Fred Duval, the director of Governor Bruce Babbitt's COPAC,
who said that "[w]hat the FEC is doing is going into this relationship between multi-
candidate PACs and prospective candidates that is really really gray. . . .[S]ome of the
areas are impossible to sort out." Associated Press, Jan. 16, 1986 (NEXIS newsfile).
53. Advisory Opinion 1986-6, supra note 35.
54. Id. This is, of course, a triumph of legalism over logic. The underlying premise
of Advisory Opinion 85-40 is that certain activities clearly constitute "testing the waters"
activity even though undertaken by an entity other than one designating itself as a "test-
ing the waters" committee. The same situation was presented by the 1986 Advisory
Opinion request of the Fund for America's Future. The difference between the two
cases is that Vice-President Bush had yet to establish a "testing the waters" committee.
Since the FEC cannot assign "testing the waters" status - as it can assign "candidate"
status - the Commissioners were forced either to ignore the Bush COPAC's activities
or consider them sufficient to trigger full "candidate" status. In choosing the former
course, the FEC ensured that no potential candidate with a COPAC would form a "test-
ing the waters" committee, since that candidate would thereby face limits on COPAC
spending that his or her rivals would avoid. Had the FEC chosen to confer candidate
status on these activities, which again had been characterized as "testing the waters" by
the Commission just two months earlier, the Commission would have reaffirmed the
approach chosen by Congress - that of not using the nature and amount of expendi-





Convention. Such delegates will play a vital role in the selection of
Michigan's delegates to the 1988 Republican National Convention.
For this reason, the FEC's General Counsel, in a draft opinion which
the Commission refused to adopt, concluded that expenditures to
assist these potential delegates would constitute spending for the
purpose of influencing the nomination of a presidential candidate,
and so should be considered contributions to a Bush-for-President
campaign. Expenditures of over $5000 for such a purpose would,
under the draft opinion, trigger candidacy status and be counted
against expenditure ceilings.55
In the draft opinion, the General Counsel took the crucial step of
looking beyond the formal status of COPAC expenditures. Thus
the draft rejected the suggestion that because these state delegates
are not candidates for federal office, COPAC expenditures on their
campaigns are not covered by the FECA. Furthermore, the General
Counsel's draft refused to indulge the fiction that a COPAC is in-
dependent of its founder's influence. Instead, it presumed that a
COPAC's founder consents to and is chargeable with the actions of
his or her Fund.56 Both of these approaches indicated a willingness
to abjure mechanical application of the FECA and, in the words of
Commissioner Harris, "acknowledge what everyone knows: that
Vice President Bush is running for President and is financing his
campaign through the Fund for America's Future, Inc., which he or-
ganized and controls."
'57
The opinion of the General Counsel, despite the strong support it
received from Commissioner Harris, did not prevail on the delegate
selection issue. Instead, the Commission decided58 that Bush's
Fund could make expenditures to recruit and assist precinct dele-
gates without triggering a Bush candidacy or accruing expenditures
under the ceilings set by the FECA.5 9
This decision was a serious misstep in the FEC's examination of
COPACs, and demonstrates the need for reform in a number of
ways. First of all, the result was "just plain ridiculous:" ' 60 COPACs
55. Draft Advisory Opinion 1986-6, Federal Election Commission, by Charles N.
Steele and N. Bradley Litchfield, at 19 (Feb. 28, 1986) (copy on file with YALE LAW &
PoLIcY REVIEW).
56. Id.
57. Advisory Opinion 1986-6, supra note 35, at 11,260 (Harris, Comm'r, dissenting).
58. It is telling that the Commission's decision smacks more of political accomoda-
tion than of reasoned decision-making. The part of the General Counsel's draft that
would have made Vice-President Bush's delegate financing a campaign expenditure was
rejected because all of the Commission's Republicans voted against it.
59. Advisory Opinion 1986-6, supra note 35.
60. Id. at 11,261.
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may spend unlimited amounts of money assisting precinct delegates
who will later choose their state's delegation to the Republican con-
vention. Although there is nothing inherently wrong with such ex-
penditures, the FEC should be imposing on them the limits which
Congress intended should constrain expenditures for a presidential
nomination. COPAC money spent to aid potential delegates is
money spent to help a particular individual become president. It
ought to be regulated as such.
Secondly, the Commission's Advisory Opinion rejected the sensi-
ble line drawn by the FEC's counsel, a line that acknowledged both
the real purpose of these expenditures and Vice-President Bush's
control of the PAC he organized. Instead, the FEC elevated form
over function. Because precinct delegates do not seek federal office,
the Commission reasoned that the Fund's promotion of their candi-
dacies could not be designed to further a presidential campaign.
Similarly, because Vice-President Bush has not yet declared his can-
didacy, the FEC presumed that the actions of the Fund had nothing
to do with his aspirations. By embracing these formalistic ap-
proaches to the COPAC problem, the Commission provided a way
for presidential campaigns to be funded without significant federal
regulation, as long as a pretense of noncandidacy is maintained.61
Lastly, the FEC's consideration of the Baker and Bush PACs' re-
quests for Advisory Opinions revealed some of the limitations of the
Advisory Opinion as a regulatory tool. Advisory Opinions are
designed to help guide candidates through the gray areas of federal
campaign regulation. A law-abiding candidate may request advice
when puzzled by the law, and then follow the Commission's advice
with the assurance that such compliance can serve as a defense
against any later charges of improper action. 62 However, Congress
has specifically limited the applicability of Advisory Opinions so that
the advisory opinion process cannot be used to establish general
rules regarding the application of the FECA.63 For this reason, Ad-
visory Opinions may serve as a shield for candidates but not as a
sword for the prosecution of activities deemed illicit by the FEC.
They are also designed to be closely tied to the specific questions set
forth in the advisory opinion request. Thus they invite warring
61. One commentator interpreted the Advisory Opinion to mean that "[w]hen it
comes to being a presidential candidate, you can walk like a duck, travel like a duck and
eat like a duck, but you still aren't a duck until you talk like a duck." United Press
International, Jan. 23, 1986 (NEXIS newsfile).
62. 120 CONG. REC. 35,131 (1974) (statement of Representative Hays).




PACs, such as Bush's and Baker's, to seek favorable rulings by felici-
tously phrasing their requests. Ultimately, the FEC's responses to
the Bush and Baker requests have clouded rather than clarified the
legal status of COPAC expenditures.
VI. Proposed Reforms
The FEC's responses to requests for Advisory Opinions have
proven insufficient to the task of regulating COPACs. The threat
these organizations pose to the central goals of federal campaign
regulation is broad, and must be met with basic reform of the FEC's
approach to COPAC expenditures. Such reform must prevent the
facile characterization of campaign-related activities as COPAC-
sponsored, and so not subject to full FECA regulation.
The problem with COPAC spending is that its form rather than its
function has been relied upon in determining the applicability of
federal regulation. The best solution to this problem is simply to
recognize the reality that many COPAC expenditures further cam-
paigns for a nomination to the presidency. Such an approach is
hardly radical. Under § 431(9)(A) of the FECA, "expenditures" in-
clude "any payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of
money or anything of value, made by any person for the purpose of
influencing any election for Federal office." Official "expenditures"
are limited6 and must be reported.65 Thus it is the purpose of
spending rather than its name that determines its legal status. The
rejected draft Advisory Opinion to the Fund for America's Future
suggested just such an approach to the application of the FECA.
The FEC has gone amiss by ignoring this functional standard and
focusing instead on the announced intentions of potential candi-
dates. The Commission's Advisory Opinion to Bush's PAC empha-
sizes that Vice-President Bush has disavowed any official candidacy,
and that the proposed financing of precinct delegates does not so-
licit support for a clearly identified presidential candidate. 66 These
facts ought to be irrelevant. If Congress had intended to allow can-
didates to determine for themselves when their expenditures would
begin to be subject to FECA regulation, it would not have needed to
establish a $5000 threshold; it could have designed expenditure and
reporting requirements that begin when candidates feel they be-
64. These limits apply only to candidates who accept federal matching funds. See 2
U.S.C. § 441a(b)(1)(1982).
65. 2 U.S.C. § 434(b)(4).
66. Advisory Opinion 1986-6, supra note 35.
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come appropriate. The unworkability of such a standard is obvious,
yet it is towards such a rule that the FEC has been drifting.
The FEC ought to look carefully at the purposes that underlie
COPAC expenditures. This scrutiny must extend beyond the char-
acterizations offered by the COPACs themselves. In other words,
some common sense, if not political savvy, is required. The FEC
should promulgate, and the Congress accept, regulations that ex-
plicitly focus on the true purposes of COPAC spending, as distinct
from the justifications offered by potential candidates and their
COPACs. Congress should also approve regulations that presump-
tively associate a COPAC's actions with the political goals of its
organizer.
The examination of COPAC expenditures often will reveal varied
purposes, only one of which is the furtherance of a campaign for
nomination. In such circumstances, the FEC should allocate the
amount of the expenditure between these purposes. Such an alloca-
tion system is already generally used when expenditures benefit a
number of candidates.
67
The obvious problem with this functional analysis is that it re-
quires close supervision by the FEC of COPAC expenditures, and so
entails difficult decisions regarding the extent to which a particular
activity furthers a potential candidacy, rather then some other pur-
pose. Making such decisions is difficult, 68 but not impossible. For
example, in its Advisory Opinion to Senator Baker's COPAC the
FEC demonstrated a willingness and ability to characterize certain
actions as "testing the waters" activities without regard to their
stated purpose. Similar decisions could develop general guidelines
as to what activities are presumed to constitute campaign activity,
thereby giving content to the purpose standard.69
More generally, a functional analysis would be in keeping with the
original phrasing and purposes of the FECA. Indeed, the law pres-
ently asserts that certain general actions (the receipt or expenditure
of $5000) by their nature indicate that a candidacy has begun. The
67. See 11 C.F.R. § 106.1(a)(1986) ("Expenditures ... made on behalf of more than
one candidate shall be attributed to each candidate in proportion to . . . the benefit
reasonably expected to be derived").
68. For example, the Commission was forced to decide in 1976 if buttons reading
Carter/Mondale/Koch constituted an in-kind contribution from the New York Mayor's
campaign to the presidential ticket. The Commission held that it did not. Malbin, After
Surviving Its First Election Year, FEC Is Wary of the Future, Nat'l.J. 469, 471 (1977).
69. Some rules seem obvious. For example, it seems appropriate to assume that a
COPAC is funding presidential campaign activity when it supports frequent travel to, or
the presence of staff in, early primary or caucus states, or consistently features a poten-




law also establishes that expenditures over $5000 are significant
enough to require regulation. Thus a functional analysis of COPAC
expenditures would simply reflect Congress' original conviction that
the actions of a candidate are recognizable as such and ought to be
regulated early in the nomination process. While this approach
would not always work perfectly, it would certainly work better than
the current approach to COPAC expenditures, which is to ignore
them. 7
0
This stricter approach to COPAC expenditures would force po-
tential candidates to make hard choices regarding the allocation of
the money they may spend under the FECA. Activities financed in
1985 would mean lower expenditures in 1988, and money spent in
New Hampshire today would limit spending in that state during the
week before its primary. The necessity of such choices is inherent in
the regulatory structure adopted by Congress. It may be that cam-
paigns have significantly changed since the FECA was enacted, and
now require longer and more expensive efforts. Indeed, the rise of
COPACs may be in part attributable to this perceived need both to
start early and to preserve the ability to spend later. Reinvigorating
the FEC's treatment of COPAC expenditures would repressurize
this situation.
In the face of such pressures, it may be tempting to regard
COPAC activities as useful in filling the gap between one election
and the beginning of the next official campaign season, and there-
fore not requiring regulation. However, such a laissez-faire ap-
proach ignores the very concerns that motivated the expenditure
and contribution limits of the FECA Amendments of 1974. Con-
gress applied those spending limits and public financing require-
ments to primaries lest its reforms of the general election process
"only move the evils it seeks to remedy upstream to the primary
phase."' 71 To ignore COPAC activities is to allow the polluting in-
fluence of large and unreported contributions to move up to and
settle in at the earliest stages of the electoral process, and thereby to
allow a consequence of campaign reform that Congress specifically
sought to avoid.
If Congress should find that the lengthening of campaigns places
70. Of course, the Advisory Opinion issued to Senator Baker's PAC indicates that
the FEC is aware that COPAC spending can constitute either "testing the waters" or
campaign spending.
71. SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 6. These limits are indexed, so inflation from
1974 to 1986 does not account for a significant part of the perceived shortfall in permit-
ted funding. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(c) (1982).
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undue stress upon existing campaign finance laws, it might wish to
consider increasing the expenditure limits. Ceilings that are specific
to each of the four years prior to the election might serve to cap
expenditures while allaying candidates' fears of spending too large a
part of an overall allowance early in the campaign. Unless and until
Congress acts, however, the FEC must vigorously apply the Federal
Election Campaign Act to all expenditures that further candidacies
for the presidency, including those funded by COPACs.
VII. Conclusion
The question posed by present patterns of COPAC spending is
this: Will our nation continue to restrict campaign spending? The
Federal Election Campaign Act cannot play its proper role in con-
trolling the conduct of campaigns until outlays by COPACs on po-
tential candidates' activities are considered to be campaign
expenditures. The FEC cannot deal with this problem by relying
upon candidates' self-serving statements about the purpose of such
spending. Instead, the Commission should adopt a more explicitly
functional analysis of COPAC expenditures, so that neither the offi-
cial source of this money nor the candidate's stated intentions allow
a shadow presidential campaign to masquerade as a political action
committee.
- Eric Mogilnicki
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